Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation

Research Projects and Empirical Data

8-19-2011

Kinder v. Geithner - American Nurses Association
Amicus Brief
American Nurses Association

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
Automated Citation
American Nurses Association, "Kinder v. Geithner - American Nurses Association Amicus Brief " (2011). Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper 94.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/94

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

No. 11-1973
________________
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
PETER KINDER, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
TIMOTHY GEITHNER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
_____________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
_____________________
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION;
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS; AMERICAN MEDICAL
STUDENT ASSOCIATION; DOCTORS FOR AMERICA;
NATIONAL HISPANIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION; AND THE
NATIONAL PHYSICIANS ALLIANCE IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE
_____________________

Ian Millhiser
Center for American Progress
1333 H St. NW, 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
(202)481-8228
imillhiser@americanprogress.org
Attorney for Amici Curiae

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 1

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Amici curiae American Nurses Association, American Academy of
Pediatrics, American Medical Student Association, National Hispanic
Medical Association, and National Physicians Alliance are nonprofit
corporations which are not publicly held. No publicly owned entity owns
more than 10 percent of their stock.
Amicus curiae Doctors for America is a project of the Center for
American Progress, a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the
District of Columbia. The Center for American Progress is not a publicly
held corporation and no corporation or other publicly held entity owns more
than 10 percent of its stock.

i

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 2

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... iiiii
Interests of the Amici Curiae .......................................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 7
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Empowers Congress to Enact
Provisions That Are Reasonably Adapted To Making A Broader
Regulatory Scheme Effective ...................................................................... 7
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision is "Reasonably Adapted" To
Congress' Legitimate Ends Of Regulating Interstate Commerce in the
Health Market and Ensuring that Federal Health Care Spending is Not
Wasted ....................................................................................................... 10
1. Removing The Minimum Coverage Provision Would Drive Up The
Costs of Care For The Uninsured and Shift These Costs To Persons
With Insurance ....................................................................................... 11
2. Removing the Minimum Coverage Provision Drastically Reduces
the Value of the ACA's Subsidies and Imperils the National Insurance
Market .................................................................................................... 17
C. A Decision Upholding the Minimum Coverage Provision Under The
Necessary And Proper Clause Would Have A Clear Limiting Principle . 21
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 23
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(a)(7)(B).................................................... 25
ii

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 3

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) ............................ 9
Florida v. HHS, Nos. 11-11021 & 11067, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16806
(Aug 12, 2011) ……………………………………………………………8
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)…………………………………passim
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).............................. 7
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).......................................... passim
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, (2010)....................... 7, 9, 16, 20
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) .............. 3, 4, 9
Statutes
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd . 5, 6, 11,
15
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) .......................................................................................... passim
Other Authorities
Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform
in Washington, Kentucky and Massachusetts, 25 J. of Heath Politics, Pol'y
and L. 133 (2000) ................................................................................ 19, 22
Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating and Sustainable Individual
Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23 Health Affairs 167 (2004) 19
Ben Furnas & Peter Harbage, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The Cost-shift from the
Uninsured 2 (March 24, 2009) ............................................................ 15, 22
Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of People with Disabilities ..... 4
Brief of Amici Curiae Economic Scholars ..................................................... 9
Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate
to Obtain Health Insurance 2 (June 16, 2010) .................................... 18, 21
Institute of Medicine, America’s Uninsured Crisis: Consequences for Health
and Health Care (February 2009) .................................................. 12, 14, 15
iii

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 4

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

Institute of Medicine, Care Without Coverage: Too Little, Too Late (2002).
............................................................................................................. 13, 15
Institute of Medicine, Health Insurance is a Family Matter (2002). ........ 5, 11
J. Michael McWilliams, Health Consequences of Uninsurance Among
Adults in the United States: Recent Evidence and Implications, 87
Milbank Q. 443 (2009) .................................................................... 6, 14, 16
Jay J. Shen and Elmer L. Washington, Disparities in Outcomes Among
Patients With Stroke Associated With Insurance Status, 38 Stroke 1010
(2007) ........................................................................................................ 14
Jonathan Gruber, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Health Care Reform is a ‘ThreeLegged Stool 1 (Aug. 5, 2010) .................................................................. 18
Maine Bureau of Insurance, White Paper: Maine's Individual Health
Insurance Market (January 22, 2001) ................................................. 19, 23
Peter G. Szilagyi, et al., Improved Asthma Care After Enrollment in the State
Children's Health Insurance Program in New York, 117 Pediatrics 486
(2006) ........................................................................................................ 14
Thomas R. McLean, International Law, Telemedicine & Health Insurance:
China as a Case Study, 32 Am. J. L. and Med. 7, 21 (2006) .................... 17
Vickie Yates Brown, et al., Health Care Reform in Kentucky - Setting the
Stage for the Twenty-First Century?, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 319 (2000) ....... 19

iv

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 5

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

Interests of the Amici Curiae 1
Amici are diverse health care provider organizations representing
millions of doctors, nurses and other health care professionals throughout the
country. Amici believe that the Affordable Care Act is a significant
achievement for the patients that their members serve because it ensures
greater protection against losing or being denied health insurance coverage
and it promotes better access to primary care and to wellness and prevention
programs. The Act’s goal of optimizing health insurance coverage for the
greatest number of people permits healthcare professionals to place their
attention on the most important thing—the patient’s well-being and
healing—rather than on economic considerations.
Amici have a significant interest in assisting the Court in
understanding that the minimum coverage provision challenged by plaintiffs
is essential to the Affordable Care Act's provisions ensuring that health
insurance is both universally available and affordable. Because amici’s
members work on the front lines of the health care system, they know from

1

This brief is filed with the consent of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 29(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 29(c)(5), counsel for amici represent that no counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part and that none of the parties or their
counsel, nor any other person or entity other than amici, its members or its
counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief.
1

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 6

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

experience that patients who put off needed care due to lack of insurance
often end up sicker and require much costlier emergency room care.
Moreover, amici’s members work throughout the continuum of care and in
all settings within the health care industry—from direct care to hospital
administration. As a result, amici have a uniquely broad perspective on the
impact of the Affordable Care Act and the capacity to offer information that
can guide the court’s understanding of the consequences of removing the
minimum coverage provision to the health provider, patients, and insurance
markets as a whole.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the district court correctly determined that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this case, there is no need for this Court to reach the
merits of appellant’s claims. Should this Court decide to reach the merits,
however, a decision upholding the challenged provision under the Necessary
and Proper Clause would provide a limited basis to uphold this provision
without raising the specter of a national police power.
Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) ("ACA") to achieve near-universal
health insurance coverage, significantly reduce the economic costs of poor
outcomes among presently uninsured Americans, prevent cost shifting from
2
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uninsured Americans receiving uncompensated care to Americans with
insurance, and improve the financial security of all families against medical
costs. § 10106(a). Yet, as Congress determined in enacting the ACA, the
reforms enacted to achieve these goals cannot function effectively without a
provision requiring all Americans who can afford insurance to either obtain
it or pay an additional portion of their income with their annual tax return. 2
§ 1501(a)(2)(G). Although the government correctly argues that the
minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce
and Taxing powers, these arguments are ultimately unnecessary to uphold
the ACA. The minimum coverage provision is essential to ensuring that the
ACA’s insurance regulations function effectively—and this fact alone
compels this Court to uphold the Act under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that courts
should "refuse to excise individual components" of a larger regulatory
scheme even when those components could not be enacted on their own
under the Commerce Clause); id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of
interstate commerce, 'it possesses every power needed to make that

The ACA labels this provision the "Requirement to Maintain Minimum
Essential Coverage." § 1501. The provision is referred to as the "minimum
coverage provision" throughout this brief.
2

3

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 8

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

regulation effective.’” (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110, 118 (1942)) (emphasis added)).
The necessary link between the ACA’s minimum coverage provision
and its insurance regulations is proven by the experience of every single
state to require insurers to cover persons with preexisting conditions without
also enacting a minimum coverage provision. See Brief of Amici Curiae
American Association of People with Disabilities, et al, at 5–11. Seven
states enacted preexisting conditions laws without also enacting a minimum
coverage provision, and all seven states experienced sharp spikes in
insurance premiums—or worse. Id. Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire and
Washington each lost most or all of their individual market insurers after
those states enacted a preexisting conditions provision without enacting a
minimum coverage provision, and the cost of some New Jersey health plans
more than tripled after that state enacted a similar law. See infra at 21.
This necessary link between the ACA’s insurance regulations and the
minimum coverage provision also distinguishes this provision from
hypothetical laws compelling the purchase of consumer goods or other
items. There is no federal law which depends upon mandatory car ownership
or mandatory vegetable purchases, for example, in order to function properly
in the same way that the ACA’s preexisting conditions provision can only
4
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function properly in the presence of a minimum coverage provision.
Accordingly, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide a
constitutional basis for such hypothetical laws in the same way that it
supports the minimum coverage provision. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 38
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he power to enact laws enabling
effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in
conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it
extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation
effective.” (emphasis added)).
The Necessary and Proper Clause also empowers Congress to ensure
that federal monies are not spent wastefully. See Sabri v. United States, 541
U.S. 600, 605 (2004). Many health conditions and illnesses, if caught early
and treated with appropriate follow-up care, can be relatively inexpensive to
resolve. Many conditions can be avoided altogether through preventive care.
Yet if these conditions or illnesses do not receive prompt and appropriate
treatment, they can often require hospitalization or otherwise deteriorate into
a serious condition requiring expensive care. See Institute of Medicine,
Health Insurance is a Family Matter 106 (2002). Because federal law
requires virtually all emergency rooms to stabilize patients regardless of
their ability to pay, see Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42
5

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 10

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

U.S.C. § 1395dd., the cost of this expensive care winds up being transferred
to patients with insurance or to government programs such as Medicare or
Medicaid.
Uninsured patients who are near the retirement age are also likely to
be less healthy than their insured counterparts when they enter the Medicare
program. As a result, previously uninsured Medicare beneficiaries with
common conditions such as diabetes or heart disease “reported 13 percent
more doctor visits, 20 percent more hospitalizations, and 51 percent more
total medical expenditures” than similarly situated patients who were insured
prior to qualifying for Medicare. J. Michael McWilliams, Health
Consequences of Uninsurance Among Adults in the United States: Recent
Evidence and Implications, 87 Milbank Q. 443, 468 (2009) ("Uninsurance
Among Adults")
By encouraging nearly all Americans to join insurance pools, the
minimum coverage provision empowers patients to seek treatment before
their conditions become prohibitively expensive to treat and it prevents the
costs of their treatment from being transferred to taxpayer-funded programs.
This provides a second reason why the Court should uphold the minimum
coverage provision. See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605.

6
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ARGUMENT
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Empowers Congress to Enact
Provisions That Are Reasonably Adapted To Making A Broader
Regulatory Scheme Effective
“[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the
Constitution’s

grants

of

specific

federal

legislative

authority

are

accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’
or ‘conducive’” to an enumerated power’s “beneficial exercise.” United
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 418 (1819)). Moreover, “Chief
Justice Marshall emphasized that the word ‘necessary’ does not mean
‘absolutely necessary.’” Id.

Rather, “[I]n determining whether the

Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to
enact a particular federal statute, [courts] look to see whether the statute
constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a
constitutionally enumerated power.” Id. at 1956 (emphasis in original).
The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact
comprehensive schemes regulating interstate commercial markets—such as
the national health care or health insurance market—even if individual
components of that scheme would exceed Congress’ limited powers if
enacted as standalone provisions. As the Supreme Court explained in
7
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Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), a court should not excise “an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity” simply because that part
could not be enacted alone under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 24 (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 3 This power, however, is
limited. It “can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional
regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures
necessary to make interstate regulation effective.”

Id. at 38 (Scalia, J,

concurring in the judgment).
Appellants ask this Court to impose an additional, extra-constitutional
limit on Congressional power—holding that Congress may not require a
temporarily inactive health care consumer to take a particular action. Even if

3

The Eleventh Circuit suggested in Florida v. HHS, Nos. 11-11021 &
11067, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16806 (Aug 12, 2011) that this rule only
applies to as-applied challenges, and not to claims that a federal law is
invalid on its face. Id. at *131. This novel suggestion, however, conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (indicating that a
law would have been upheld against a facial challenge if it had been an
"essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity. . . .") Florida also
conflicts with the decisions of this Court and with previous decisions of the
Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 714 (8th
Cir. 2009) (“Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that
regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate
commerce.” (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring))); United
States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here Congress
comprehensively regulates economic activity, it may constitutionally
regulate intrastate activity, whether economic or not, so long as the inability
to do so would undermine Congress’s ability to implement effectively the
overlying economic regulatory scheme.”)
8
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it were true that individuals subject to the minimum coverage provision are
not active participants in the health care market—and it is not, see generally
Brief of Amici Curiae Economic Scholars—appellants’ activity/inactivity
distinction finds no support in precedent. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 297 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing a legal
distinction between laws regulating action and those regulating inaction as
“specious”). As Justice Scalia explains, "where Congress has the authority to
enact a regulation of interstate commerce, 'it possesses every power needed
to make that regulation effective.'" Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at
118) (emphasis added); see also Comstock, 130 S.Ct at 1968 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that Congress may exercise its
necessary and proper power to ensure that another provision of law does
“not put in motion a particular force . . . that endangers others”).
The Necessary and Proper Clause also empowers Congress to ensure
that federal monies are not spent wastefully. In Sabri v. United States, 541
U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court upheld a wide-reaching statute
criminalizing bribery of any state official whose agency or government
receives federal funds, even though the statute swept broadly to include
officials who have no contact with the federal funds.

As the Court

9
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explained, "Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate
federal monies to promote the general welfare, and it has corresponding
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to see to it that taxpayer
dollars" are not "frittered away" by bribery-motivated projects that are not
cost-effective. Id. at 605 (citations omitted).
B.

The Minimum Coverage Provision is "Reasonably Adapted" To
Congress' Legitimate Ends Of Regulating Interstate Commerce in
the Health Market and Ensuring that Federal Health Care
Spending is Not Wasted
To accomplish its goals of improving health outcomes, extending

insurance coverage and promoting financial security against health costs, the
ACA creates an interconnected network of subsidies and regulations. Most
notably, the Act prohibits insurers from denying coverage to consumers with
preexisting conditions or charging them higher premiums, ACA § 2704, and
it provides tax subsidies for insurance coverage to individuals with incomes
between 133% and 400% of the poverty line. § 1401–02, 2001. Without the
minimum coverage provision, these two provisions will be severely
undermined. Rather than ensuring equal access to insurance for Americans
with disabilities or preexisting conditions, the ACA's preexisting conditions
provision would threaten the nationwide individual insurance market if it
does not take effect in conjunction with a minimum coverage provision.
10
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Likewise, the generous subsidies offered by the ACA will diminish
drastically in value absent a minimum coverage provision.
1.

Removing The Minimum Coverage Provision Would
Drive Up The Costs of Care For The Uninsured and
Shift These Costs To Persons With Insurance

Many health conditions and illnesses, if caught early and treated with
appropriate follow-up care, can be relatively inexpensive to resolve. Many
conditions can be avoided altogether through preventive care. Yet if these
conditions or illnesses do not receive prompt and appropriate treatment, they
can often require hospitalization or otherwise deteriorate into a serious
condition requiring expensive care.

See Institute of Medicine, Health

Insurance is a Family Matter 106 (2002). Because federal law requires
virtually all emergency rooms to stabilize patients regardless of their ability
to pay, see Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd., the cost of this expensive care winds up being transferred to
patients with insurance or to government programs such as Medicare or
Medicaid.

Accordingly the minimum coverage provision is reasonably

adapted to ensuring that government health care spending is not “frittered
away” on preventable health care costs. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605.
The likelihood that a patient will receive adequate preventive care or
early treatment is directly related to whether the patient is insured. One
11
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study determined that children enrolled in a public health insurance plan
were 15 percentage points more likely to receive preventive care than those
who were not.

Institute of Medicine, America’s Uninsured Crisis:

Consequences for Health and Health Care 61 (February 2009) (“Uninsured
Crisis”). Likewise, multiple studies found that uninsured children are "less
likely to be up-to-date on their immunizations than insured children,
controlling for observed characteristics of the children." Id. Use of dental
services also increases between 16 and 40 percentage points among children
who are insured. Id. at 62.
The data for adult patients is ever starker:
[C]hronically ill adults who lacked health insurance had five to
nine fewer health care visits per year than chronically ill adults
who have health insurance. Uninsured adults with chronic
illnesses were much more likely than their insured peers to go
without any medical visits during the year—even when they
were diagnosed with serious conditions such as asthma (23.4 of
uninsured adults with no visits vs. 6.2 percent of insured
adults), COPD (13.2 vs. 4.0 percent), depression (19.3 vs. 5.2
percent), diabetes (11.0 vs. 5.2 percent), heart disease (8.7 vs.
2.9 percent), or hypertension (12.7 vs. 5.3 percent).
Similarly, uninsured adults with asthma, cancer, COPD,
diabetes, heart disease, or hypertension are at least twice as
likely as their insured peers to say that they were unable to
receive or had to delay receiving a needed prescription[.]
Id. at 65. Likewise, routine preventive care such as "mammography, Pap
testing, cholesterol testing, and influenza vaccination" is far less common

12
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among adults who experience frequent periods of uninsurance. Id. While
women who are consistently insured have a 76.7 percent chance of receiving
mammographies, that chance declines to 34.7 percent for women who
experience frequent periods of uninsurance. Id.

Uninsured adults are also

much less likely to have a continuing relationship with a single provider.
Among uninsured adults, "19 percent with heart disease, 14 percent with
hypertension, and 26 percent with arthritis do not have a regular source of
care, compared with 8, 4, and 7 percent, respectively, of their insured
counterparts." Institute of Medicine, Care Without Coverage: Too Little,
Too Late 29 (2002) ("Care Without Coverage"). This disparity is troubling
because patients with chronic conditions often must "modify[] their
behavior, monitor[] their condition and participat[e] in treatment regimens"
in order to keep their condition under control. Id. at 57. Such tasks require
patients to develop a complex understanding of their condition and to master
tasks that do not come naturally to persons without education or training in
the health sciences. Thus, a patient's continuing relationship with a single
provider who can answer their questions and monitor their care is "a key to
high-quality health care" for persons with chronic conditions. Id.
There is robust data demonstrating that uninsured patients' diminished
access to care causes their medical conditions to deteriorate. One study
13
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found that "near-elderly adults who lost their insurance were subsequently
82 percent more likely than those who kept their private insurance to report a
decline in overall health." Uninsurance Among Adults 469. The rate of
asthma-related hospital stays for children with asthma in New York dropped
from 11.1 percent to 3.4 percent when those children were enrolled in a state
insurance program. Peter G. Szilagyi, et al., Improved Asthma Care After
Enrollment in the State Children's Health Insurance Program in New York,
117 Pediatrics 486, 491 (2006). Uninsured children diagnosed with diabetes
are "more likely to present with severe and life-threatening diabetic
ketoacidosis" than insured children with the same condition. Uninsured
Crisis at 71.

Among stroke patients, "[t]he mortality risk of uninsured

patients was 24% to 56% higher than that of their privately insured peers for
acute hemorrhagic and acute ischemic stroke, respectively." Jay J. Shen and
Elmer L. Washington, Disparities in Outcomes Among Patients With Stroke
Associated With Insurance Status, 38 Stroke 1010, 1013 (2007). Likewise,
"5-year survival rates for uninsured adults were significantly lower than for
privately insured adults diagnosed with breast or colorectal cancer—two
prevalent cancers for which there are not only effective screening tests, but
also treatments demonstrated to improve survival." Uninsured Crisis at 78.
Indeed, a recent Institute of Medicine report documented dozens of
14
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empirical studies linking uninsurance with poor health outcomes and
deteriorated medical conditions. See generally Uninsured Crisis.
When uninsured patients fail to receive preventive care, continuing
care or early treatment, their healthcare needs and the cost of meeting those
needs still require them to participate in the health care market.

As a

condition of their hospital's participation in Medicare, hospital emergency
departments must stabilize any patent who seeks treatment for an emergency
medical condition regardless of the patient's ability to pay. See Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. Thus, an uninsured
patient whose condition deteriorates because they are unable to afford less
expensive preventive or early care will nonetheless receive expensive
emergency treatment for that condition. See Care Without Coverage at 58
(indicating that many uninsured patients "identify an emergency department
as their regular source of care"). The cost of this uncompensated care is then
distributed to other patients or to government health programs such as
Medicare or Medicaid. According to one study, this cost shifting adds, on
average, $410 to each individual insurance premium and $1,100 to each
family premium. Ben Furnas & Peter Harbage, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The
Cost-Shift from the Uninsured 2 (March 24, 2009) (“Cost-Shift”).

15
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Uninsured patients' likelihood to delay care and the subsequent
deterioration of health also drive up Medicare costs. A twelve-year study of
patients approaching the age of Medicare eligibility found that previously
uninsured patients with cardiovascular disease (hypertension, heart disease,
or stroke) or diabetes often did not receive widely-available and effective
treatments to prevent costly complications if their conditions developed
before they qualified for Medicare.

As a result, "previously uninsured

Medicare beneficiaries with these conditions reported 13 percent more
doctor visits, 20 percent more hospitalizations, and 51 percent more total
medical expenditures" than similarly situated patients who were insured
prior to qualifying for Medicare. Uninsurance Among Adults at 468.
Congress may, through the valid exercise of its spending power,
require Medicare hospitals to accept uninsured patients into their emergency
rooms as a condition of participation in the Medicare program. The ACA's
minimum coverage provision is reasonably adapted to preventing this
requirement from driving up the cost of Medicare to taxpayers and
increasing the cost of insurance for individual and families receiving
subsidies under the ACA. Accordingly, this provision should be upheld
under Congress' Necessary and Proper power. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at

16

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 21

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

1957; Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)); Sabri,
541 U.S. at 604–08.
2.

Removing the Minimum Coverage Provision
Drastically Reduces the Value of the ACA's Subsidies
and Imperils the National Insurance Market

Adverse selection occurs when an individual "wait[s] to purchase
health insurance until they need[] care," thus enabling them to receive
benefits from an insurance plan that they have not previously contributed to.
ACA § 10106(a). The consequences of adverse selection is an insurance
"death spiral" which can eventually collapse an insurance market.

See

Thomas R. McLean, International Law, Telemedicine & Health Insurance:
China as a Case Study, 32 Am. J. L. and Med. 7, 21 (2006) (“[A]dverse
selection removes good-risk patients from the market, resulting in the need
for insurers to raise their premiums; which triggers another round of adverse
selection.”)
Insurers typically defend against adverse selection by screening
potential customers with disabilities or preexisting conditions, but the ACA
specifically forbids this practice. § 2704. Thus, the ACA requires most
currently healthy Americans to participate in the insurance market to prevent
them from strategically avoiding that market until they become ill or injured.
§ 10106(a) ("[A minimum coverage provision] is essential to creating
17
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effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of
preexisting conditions can be sold.")
Because of this adverse selection problem, the Congressional Budget
Office estimates that premiums will increase drastically absent a minimum
coverage provision:
CBO and [the Joint Committee on Taxation] estimate that,
relative to current law, the elimination of the mandate would
reduce insurance coverage among healthier people to a greater
degree than it would reduce coverage among less healthy
people. As a result, in the absence of a mandate, those who
enroll would be less healthy, on average, than those enrolled
with a mandate. This adverse selection would increase
premiums for new non-group policies (purchased either in the
exchanges or directly from insurers in the non-group market)
by an estimated 15 to 20 percent relative to current law.
Without the mandate, Medicaid enrollees would also have
higher expected health spending, on average, than those
enrolled under current law.
Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate
to Obtain Health Insurance 2 (June 16, 2010) ("Effects of Eliminating")
(emphasis added); see also Jonathan Gruber, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Health
Care Reform is a ‘Three-Legged Stool 1 (Aug. 5, 2010) (estimating that the
average premium for a non-group health insurance plan would increase 27%
by 2019 if the ACA goes into effect without a minimum coverage
provision).
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If anything, this CBO estimate greatly underestimates the cost of
excising the minimum coverage provision. States which required insurers to
cover individuals with preexisting conditions but did not enact a minimum
coverage provision experienced far more drastic consequences than the
premium spikes CBO predicts.

Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire and

Washington each lost most or all of their individual market insurers after
those states enacted a preexisting conditions provision without enacting a
minimum coverage provision, and the cost of some New Jersey health plans
more than tripled after that state enacted a similar law. See Vickie Yates
Brown, et al., Health Care Reform in Kentucky - Setting the Stage for the
Twenty-First Century?, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 319, 330 (2000) (“Health Care
Reform in Kentucky”); Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with
Individual Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky and Massachusetts, 25
J. of Health Politics, Pol'y and L. 133, 140, 152 (2000) (“Riding the Bull”);
Maine Bureau of Insurance, White Paper: Maine's Individual Health
Insurance Market 5, 8, (January 22, 2001) (“Maine’s Individual Health
Insurance Market”), Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating and
Sustainable Individual Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23 Health
Affairs 167, 169–70 (2004).
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As the experience of these states and the weight of economic evidence
demonstrates, the minimum coverage provision is necessary to prevent the
preexisting conditions provision from creating a fatal adverse selection
spiral—and this is sufficient reason to uphold the minimum coverage
provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct.
at 1956; see also id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(explaining that Congress may exercise its necessary and proper power to
ensure that another provision of law does “not put in motion a particular
force . . . that endangers others”). Congress’s Necessary and Proper power is
at its apex when, as is the case here, there is a certain and empiricallydemonstrated link between a provision of law regulating interstate
commerce and another provision chosen to ensure that the commercial
regulation functions effectively. See id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“When the injury is whether a federal law has sufficient links
to an enumerated power to be within the scope of federal authority, the
analysis depends not on the number of links in the congressional-power
chain but on the strength of the chain.”); Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Additionally, removing the minimum coverage provision would, in
the words of Sabri, "fritter[] away" literally hundreds of billions of "taxpayer
20

Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 25

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971

dollars." 541 U.S. at 605. The Congressional Budget Office determined that
eliminating the minimum coverage provision would increase the federal
deficit by $252 billion between 2014 and 2020, with approximately 60
percent of this additional debt stemming from increased health care costs.
Effects of Eliminating at 1. Yet while the federal government would spend
hundreds of billions more without a minimum coverage provision, the nation
would receive far less for its investment, as excising the minimum coverage
provision "would increase the number of uninsured by about 16 million
people, resulting in an estimated 39 million uninsured in 2019." Id. at 2.
Because the minimum coverage provision is both necessary to ensure
that the preexisting conditions provision is effective and essential to prevent
hundreds of billions of dollars from being "frittered away," it falls
comfortably within Congress’ Necessary and Proper power.
C.

A Decision Upholding the Minimum Coverage Provision
Under The Necessary And Proper Clause Would Have A
Clear Limiting Principle

Appellants argue that, were the Affordable Care Act to be upheld,
such a holding would “practically end the concept of a limited federal
government of enumerated powers.” Appellants Br. at 57, requiring courts to
uphold laws requiring individuals to purchase “automobiles, banking,
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housing or food.” Id. This claim, however, ignores the unique nature of the
health insurance market.
As explained above, the health insurance market faces a unique “cost
shifting” problem, which causes prices in the health care market to behave in
a counterintuitive manner. See Cost-Shifting at 2 (explaining that
uncompensated care provided to the uninsured adds $410 to each individual
insurance premium and $1,100 to each family premium). The laws of supply
and demand dictate that a law that increased the number of people
purchasing cars would also drive up the cost of those cars. Likewise, a law
adding more consumers to the vegetable market would drive up the cost of
vegetables. Health insurance, by contrast, becomes more affordable when it
is more widely purchased. Id.
Similarly, the national market for vegetables is not in danger of
collapsing if Congress does not require people to buy broccoli. Nor is there a
risk that Americans will cease to be able to obtain automobiles absent a law
requiring the purchase of GM cars. The nation’s individual health insurance
market, by contrast, is susceptible to complete collapse if people can wait
until they are ill or injured to buy insurance. See Riding the Bull at 140 &
152 (describing the catastrophic consequences of enacting a preexisting
conditions law without a minimum coverage provision in Kentucky and
22
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Washington); Maine’s Individual Health Insurance Market at 5 & 8
(describing same in Maine and New Hampshire).
More importantly, there is no federal law which depends upon
mandatory car ownership or mandatory food purchases in order to function
properly in the same way that the ACA’s preexisting conditions provision
can only function properly in the presence of a minimum coverage
provision. Accordingly, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide a
constitutional basis for such hypothetical laws in the same way that it
supports the minimum coverage provision. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 38
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he power to enact laws enabling
effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in
conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it
extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation
effective.” (emphasis added)).
CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully submit that the Court should AFFIRM the decision
of the district court dismissing the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Should the Court reach the merits, however, amici submits that
the minimum coverage provision falls squarely within Congress’ authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
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